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Abstract
Algorithms for equilibrium computation generally
make no attempt to ensure that the computed strate-
gies are understandable by humans. For instance
the strategies for the strongest poker agents are rep-
resented as massive binary files. In many situations,
we would like to compute strategies that can ac-
tually be implemented by humans, who may have
computational limitations and may only be able to
remember a small number of features or compo-
nents of the strategies that have been computed. We
study poker games where private information dis-
tributions can be arbitrary. We create a large train-
ing set of game instances and solutions, by ran-
domly selecting the information probabilities, and
present algorithms that learn from the training in-
stances in order to perform well in games with un-
seen information distributions. We are able to con-
clude several new fundamental rules about poker
strategy that can be easily implemented by humans.
1 Introduction
Large-scale computation of strong game-theoretic strategies
is important in many domains. For example, there has been
significant recent study on solving game-theoretic problems
in national security from which real deployed systems have
been built, such as a randomized security check system
for airports [Paruchuri et al., 2008]. Typically large-scale
equilibrium-finding algorithms output massive strategy files
(which are often encoded in binary), which are stored in a ta-
ble and looked up by a computer during gameplay. For exam-
ple, creators of the optimal strategy for two-player limit Texas
hold ’em recently wrote, “Overall, we require less than 11 TB
of storage to store the regrets and 6 TB to store the average
strategy during the computation, which is distributed across
a cluster of computation nodes. This amount is infeasible to
store in main memory,...” [Bowling et al., 2015]. While such
approaches lead to very strong computer agents, it is difficult
to see how a human could implement these strategies. For
cases where humans will be making real-time decisions we
would like to compute strategies that are easily interpretable.
Suppose a human plans to play the following two-player
no-limit poker game. Player 1 and player 2 both ante $0.50
and are dealt a card from a 10-card deck and each have a stack
of $3 after posting the ante. Player 1 can bet any multiple of
0.1 from 0 to 3 (he has 31 possible actions for each hand).
Player 2 can then call or fold. If player 2 folds, then player
1 wins the $1 from the antes. Otherwise the player with the
better card wins the amount bet plus the antes. For example, if
player 1 has a 4, player 2 has a 9, player 1 bets 0.4 and player
2 calls, then player 2 wins 0.4 plus the antes.
If both players are dealt cards uniformly at random (Fig-
ure 1), then a Nash equilibrium strategy for player 1 is:
• Card 1: Bet 0.1 pr. 0.091, 0.6 pr. 0.266, 1.8 pr. 0.643
• Card 2: Bet 0 pr. 0.660, 0.3 pr. 0.231, 0.6 pr. 0.109
• Card 3-6: Bet 0 pr. 1
• Card 7: Bet 0.1 pr. 1
• Card 8: Bet 0.3 pr. 1
• Card 9: Bet 0.6 pr. 1
• Card 10: Bet 1.8 pr. 1
This can be computed quickly using, e.g., a linear program-
ming formulation [Koller and Megiddo, 1992].
However, suppose the cards are dealt according a different
distribution: player 1 is either dealt a very strong hand (10)
or a very weak hand (1) with probability 0.5 while player 2
is always dealt a medium-strength hand (Figure 2). Then the
equilibrium strategy for player 1 is:
• Card 1: Bet 0 pr. 0.25, 3 pr. 0.75
• Card 10: Bet 3 pr. 1
If player 1 is always dealt a medium-strength hand (5) while
player 2 is dealt a very strong or very weak hand with proba-
bility 0.5 (Figure 3), then the equilibrium strategy is:
• Card 5: Bet 0 pr. 1
What if player 1 is dealt a 1 with probability 0.09, 2 with
probability 0.19, 3 with probability 0.14, etc.? For each game
instance induced by a probability distribution over the pri-
vate information, we could solve it quickly if we had access
to an LP solver. But what if a human is to play the game
without knowing the distribution in advance and without aid
of a computer? He would need to construct a strong game
plan in advance that is capable of playing well for a vari-
ety of distributions with minimal real-time computation. A
natural approach would be to solve and memorize solutions
Figure 1: Both players are dealt private information uni-
formly at random over all hands.
Figure 2: Player 1 is dealt very strong or weak hand and
player 2 is always dealt mediocre hand.
Figure 3: Player 1 is always dealt mediocre hand and player
2 is dealt very strong or weak hand.
for several games in advance, then quickly determine which
of these games is closest to the one actually encountered in
real time. This is akin to the k-nearest neighbors (k-nn) al-
gorithm from machine learning. A second would be to con-
struct understandable rules (e.g., if .. else ..) from a database
of solutions that can be applied to a new game. This is akin
to the decision tree and decision list approaches. Thus, we
are proposing to apply approaches from machine learning in
order to improve human ability to implement Nash equilib-
rium strategies. Typically algorithms from machine learning
have been applied to game-theoretic agents only in the con-
text of learning to exploit mistakes of suboptimal opponents
(aka opponent exploitation). By and large the approaches for
computing Nash equilibrium and opponent exploitation have
been radically different. We provide a new perspective here
by integrating learning into the equilibrium-finding paradigm.
We present a novel learning formulation of this problem. In
order to apply algorithms we develop novel distance functions
(both between pairs of input points and between pairs of out-
put points) which are more natural for our setting than stan-
dard distance metrics. To evaluate our approaches we com-
pute a large database of game solutions for random private
information distributions. We are able to efficiently apply k-
nn to the dataset using our custom distance functions. We ob-
served that we are able to obtain low testing error even when
training on a relatively small fraction of the data, which sug-
gests that it is possible for humans to learn strong strategies
by memorizing solutions to a carefully selected small set of
presolved games. However, this approach would require hu-
mans to quickly be able to compute the distance between a
new game and all games from the training database in or-
der to determine the closest neighbor, which could be com-
putationally taxing. Furthermore, there are some concerns as
to whether this would actually constitute “understanding” as
opposed to “memorizing.” Thus, we focus on the decision
tree approach, which allows us to deduce simple human-
understandable rules that can be easily implemented.
While prior approaches for learning in games of imperfect
information (and poker specifically) typically utilize many
domain-specific features (e.g., number of possible draws to
a flush, number of high cards on the public board, etc.), we
prefer to develop approaches that are more robust and do not
require knowing expert domain features (since they are likely
not relevant for other domains and, in the case of poker, may
not be relevant even for other seemingly similar variants). The
features we use are the cumulative distribution function val-
ues of the private information states of the players, which are
based purely on the rules of the game. (We also compare per-
formance of using several other representations, e.g., using
pdf values, and separating out the data for each hand to create
10 data points per game instance instead of 1.) Thus, the ap-
proach is general and not reliant on expert poker knowledge.
The problem of constructing human-interpretable rules has
been studied recently in machine learning, e.g., [Bertsimas
et al., 2011; Jung et al., 2017], particularly for medical
applications [Lakkaraju et al., 2016; Letham et al., 2015;
Marewski and Gigerenzer, 2012].
2 Qualitative models and endgame solving
There has been some prior study of human understand-
able strategies in imperfect-information games, and in poker
specifically. Ankenman and Chen compute analytical solu-
tions of several simplified poker variants by first assuming a
given human-understandable qualitative structure on the equi-
librium strategies, and then computing equilibrium strategies
given this presumed structure, typically by solving a series of
indifference equations [Ankenman and Chen, 2006]. While
the computed strategies are generally interpretable by hu-
mans, the models were typically constructed from a combina-
tion of trial and error and expert intuition, and not constructed
algorithmically. More recent work has shown that leveraging
such qualitative models can lead to new equilibrium-finding
algorithms that outperform existing approaches [Ganzfried
and Sandholm, 2010]. That work proposed three different
qualitative models for the final round endgame of two-player
limit Texas hold ’em (Figures 4– 6), and showed empirically
that endgame equilibrium strategies conformed to one of the
models for all input information distributions (and that all
three were needed). Again here the models were constructed
by manual trial and error, not learned algorithmically.
We note that while the problem we are considering in this
paper is a “toy game,” it captures important aspects of real
poker games and we expect our approaches to have appli-
cation to larger more realistic variants. In the recent Brains
vs. Artificial Intelligence two-player no-limit Texas hold ’em
competition, the agent Claudico computed the strategy for the
final betting round in real time, and the best human player
in the world for that variant (Doug Polk) commented that
the “endgame solver” was the strongest component of the
agent [Ganzfried, 2015], and endgame solving was also a
crucial component of subsequent success of the improved
agent Libratus [Brown and Sandholm, 2017]. The creator
of another recent superhuman agent has stated that “Deep-
Stack is all endgame solving,” referring to the fact that its
algorithm works by viewing different rounds of the game
as separate endgames which are solved independently, us-
ing deep learning to estimate the values of the endgames ter-
minal states [Moravcı´k et al., 2017]. Endgame solving as-
sumes that both agents had private information distributions
induced by the strategies for the prior rounds using Bayes’
rule, assuming they had been following the agent’s strategy
for the prior rounds [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2015]. The
game we study here is very similar to no-limit Texas hold ’em
endgames, except that we are assuming a ten-card deck, spe-
cific stack sizes and betting increment, and that raises are not
allowed. We expect our analysis to extend in all of these di-
mensions and that our approaches will have implications for
no-limit Texas hold ’em strategy. No-limit Texas hold ’em is
the most popular poker variant for humans, and is a widely
recognized AI challenge problem. The game tree has approx-
imately 10165 states for the variant played in the AAAI An-
nual Computer Poker Competition [Johanson, 2013]. There
has been significant interest in endgame solving in particu-
lar in the last several years, and several new advances have
been developed [Burch et al., 2014; Moravcik et al., 2016;
Brown and Sandholm, 2017; Moravcı´k et al., 2017].
Figure 4: First qualitative model for two-player limit Texas hold
’em river endgame play.
Figure 5: Second qualitative model for two-player limit Texas hold
’em river endgame.
Figure 6: Third qualitative model for two-player limit Texas hold
’em river endgame.
3 Learning formulation
We now describe how we formulate the problem of comput-
ing a solution to a new game instance from a database of solu-
tions to previously solved game instances as a learning prob-
lem. The inputs to the learning problem will be the 20 val-
ues of the private information cumulative distribution func-
tion (cdf). First are the ten values for player 1 (the probability
he is dealt ≤ 1, probability he is dealt ≤ 2, etc.), followed by
the ten cdf values for player 2. For example for the uniform
case the input would be
X = (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1,
0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1),
for the situation where player 1 is dealt a 10 or 1 with proba-
bility 0.5 and player 2 is always dealt a 5 it is
X = (0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1,
0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1),
and for the situation where player 1 is always dealt a 5 and
player 2 is dealt a 10 or 1 with probability 0.5 it is
X = (0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,
0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 1).
The output will be a vector of the 310 Nash equilibrium
strategy probabilities of betting each size with each hand.
First for betting 0, 0.1, 0.2, . . . , 3 with 1, then with 2, etc.
(recall that there are 31 sizes for each of ten hands). For ex-
ample for the uniform case the output would be
y = (0, 0.091, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0.266, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0.643, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, . . .).
We could have created ten different data points for each game
corresponding to the strategy for each hand, as opposed to
predicting the full strategy for all hands; however we ex-
pect that predicting complete strategies is better than just pre-
dicting strategies for individual hands because the individual
predicted hand strategies may not balance appropriately and
could be highly exploitable as a result. We will explore this
design choice in the experiments in Section 4.
To perform learning on this formulation, we need to se-
lect a distance function to use between a pair of inputs as
well as a distance (i.e., cost) between each pair of outputs.
Standard metrics of Euclidean or Manhattan distance are not
very appropriate for probability distributions. A more nat-
ural and successful distance metric for this setting is earth
mover’s distance (EMD). While early approaches for com-
puting groupings of hands used L2 [Gilpin et al., 2007], EMD
has been shown to significantly outperform other approaches,
and the strongest current approaches for game abstraction use
EMD [Johanson et al., 2013]. Informally, EMD is the “min-
imum cost of turning one pile into the other, where the cost
is assumed to be amount of dirt moved times the distance by
which it is moved,” and there exists a linear-time algorithm
for computing it for one-dimensional histograms (Figure 7).
We define a new distance metric for our setting that gen-
eralizes EMD to multiple distributions. Suppose we want to
compute the distance between training input vector X and
Figure 7: Earth-mover’s distance has proven a successful metric for
distance between probability distributions.
testing input vector Xˆ . Each vector contains 20 probabilities,
10 corresponding to player 1’s distribution and 10 to player
2’s. Our distance function will compute the EMD separately
for each player, then return the average (Algorithm 1). We
note that before the aggregation we normalize the EMD val-
ues by the maximum possible value (the distance between a
point mass on the left-most and right-most columns) to en-
sure that the maximum of each is 1. We also create a new
distance (i.e., cost) function between predicted output vector
Yˆ and the actual output vector from the training data Y (the
output vectors have length 310, corresponding to 31 bet sizes
for 10 hands). It computes EMD separately for the strategy
vectors of size 31 for each hand which are then normalized
and averaged (Algorithm 2). After specifying the form of the
inputs and outputs and a distance metric between each pair
of inputs and outputs, we have formulated the problem as a
machine learning problem.
Algorithm 1 Distance between input vectors X , Xˆ
Inputs: cdf vectors X, Xˆ , number of players n, deck size d
X ′← cdf-to-pdf(X); Xˆ ′← cdf-to-pdf(Xˆ)
resultTotal← 0
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
start← i× d, end← start + d
result← 0, δ ← 0
for j = start to end-1 do
δ ← δ + X ′[j]− Xˆ ′[j]
result← result + |δ|
result← result / (d-1)
resultTotal← resultTotal + result
resultTotal← resultTotal / n
return resultTotal
Algorithm 2 Distance between output vectors Y , Yˆ
Inputs: Strategy vectors Y, Yˆ , deck size d, number of bet sizes b
resultTotal← 0
for i = 0 to d− 1 do
start← i× b; end← start + b
result← 0, δ ← 0
for j = start to end-1 do
δ ← δ + Y [j]− Yˆ [j]
result← result + |δ|
result← result / (b-1)
resultTotal← resultTotal + result
resultTotal← resultTotal / d
return resultTotal
4 Experiments
We constructed a database of 100,000 game instances by
generating random hand distributions and then computing a
Nash equilibrium using the linear program formulation with
Gurobi’s solver [Gurobi Optimization, Inc., 2014]. The naı¨ve
approach for constructing the distributions (of assigning uni-
form distributions for the players independently) is incorrect
because it does not account for the fact that if one player is
dealt a card then the other player cannot also be dealt that
card (as is the case in real poker). We instead used a Algo-
rithm 4. We first generate the two distributions independently
as in the naı¨ve approach, using the procedure described in Al-
gorithm 3. Algorithm 4 then multiplies these individual prob-
abilities together only for situations where players are dealt
different cards to compute a joint distribution over the private
information (these values are then normalized). The proce-
dure could be more generally applicable beyond this setting.
We then create the cdf values from the joint distribution to be
used as the inputs to the learning problem.
Algorithm 3 Generate point uniformly at random from n-
dimensional simplex
Inputs: dimension n
s = 0
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
a[i]← randomDouble(0,1)
a[i]← −1× log(a[i])
s← s+ a[i]
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
a[i]← a[i]/s
return a
Algorithm 4 Generate private information distribution
Inputs: dimension n, independent distributions x1, x2
s = 0
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
if i != j then
next← x1[i]× x2[j]
x∗[i][j]← next
s← s+ next
for i = 0 to n− 1 do
for j = 0 to n− 1 do
x∗[i][j]← x∗[i][j]/s
return x∗
We experimented with several data representations. The
first was described above. The second uses the pdf values as
the 20 features instead of the cdfs. The third separates each
datapoint into 10 different points, one for each hand of player
1. Here the first 20 inputs are the cdfs as before, followed by
a card number (1–10), which can be viewed as an additional
21st input, followed by the 31 strategy probabilities for that
card. The fourth uses this approach with the pdf features. The
5th and 6th approaches are similar, but for the 21st input they
list the cdf value of the card, not the card itself. The 7th–10th
are similar to the 3rd–6th, but randomly sample a single bet
size from the strategy vector to use as the output.
We created decision trees using 80,000 of the games from
the database, using the standard division of 80% of the data
for training and 20% for testing (so we trained on 64, 000
games and tested on 16,000). We used Python’s built in deci-
sion tree regressor function from sklearn.tree from the scikit-
learn library, which we were able to integrate with our new
distance metrics. We constructed the optimal decision tree for
depth ranging from 3 up to 20. From Figure 9, we can see the
errors of the optimal tree as a function of the depth, for each
of the different data representations. Not surprisingly error
decreases monotonically with depth; however, increasing the
depth leads to an exponential increase in the number of nodes.
Figure 10 shows how error decreases as a function of the (log
of the) the number of nodes in the optimal decision tree.
The fourth representation, which uses the pdf values plus
the cdf value of the card as the inputs, produces lowest er-
ror, and in general the approaches that output the data sepa-
rately for each card produce lower errors than the ones that
output full 310-length vectors. Note that if we were using
full exploitability to evaluate the strategies produced then al-
most surely using the full 310 outputs would perform better,
since they will take into account aggregate strategies across
all hands to ensure the overall strategy is balanced; if we bet
one size with a weak hand and a different size with a strong
hand, it would be very easy for the opponent to exploit us. In
fact, for other machine learning approaches, such as k-nn, us-
ing the full 310 outputs performs better; but for decision trees
using separate outputs for each hand leads to better branching
rules which produces lower error. Note that the pdf features
encode more information than the cdfs (it is possible for two
games with the same cdfs to have different pdfs), so we would
expect pdf features to generally outperform cdf features.
The optimal depth-4 decision tree for the approach that
uses cdf input values, cdf value for a single card, and pre-
dicts a single bet size, is shown in Figure 8. At each node
the left edge corresponds to the True branch and the right
to the False branch. The node entries are the variable/value
branched on, the error induced due to the current branch split,
the sample for the current split, and the output (i.e., bet size)
predicted (leaf nodes only contain the final three). For exam-
ple, the far right leaf node says that if x[20] <= 0.9035 is
false (i.e., player 1 has a hand with cdf value > 0.9035), ..., if
x[15] <= 0.9154 (i.e., the cdf value of a card 6 for player 2
is > 0.9154), then output a bet size of 2.3597.
From the optimal tree, we can deduce several fundamen-
tal rules of poker strategy. The “80-20 Rule” is based on the
branch leading to the very small bet size of 0.1898, and the
“All-in Rule” is based on the branch leading to the large bet
size of 2.9314 on the far right of the tree.
Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy 1 (80-20 Rule). If
your hand beats between 20% and 80% of the opponent’s dis-
tribution of hands, then you should always check (or make an
extremely small bet).
Fundamental Rule of Poker Strategy 2 (All-In Rule). If
your hand beats 95% of the opponent’s distribution of hands,
and furthermore the opponent’s distribution contains a weak
or mediocre hand no more than 90% of the time (i.e., it con-
tains at least 10% strong hands), then you should go all-in.
Figure 8: Rules for optimal depth-4 decision tree.
Figure 9: Depth vs. number of nodes and error. The errors are the
curves decreasing in depth while the number of nodes are increasing. Figure 10: Number of nodes vs. error in decision tree.
Prior “fundamental rules” have been proposed, but often
these are based on psychological factors or personal anec-
dotes, as opposed to rigorous analysis. For example, Phil Gor-
don writes, “Limping1 is for Losers. This is the most impor-
tant fundamental in poker—for every game, for every tour-
nament, every stake: If you are the first player to voluntar-
ily commit chips to the pot, open for a raise. Limping is in-
evitably a losing play. If you see a person at the table limping,
you can be fairly sure he is a bad player.” [Gordon, 2011]
5 Conclusion
We presented a novel formulation of the problem of com-
puting strong game-theoretic strategies that are human under-
standable as a machine learning problem. Traditionally com-
puting strong strategies in games has fallen under the domain
of specialized equilibrium-finding algorithms that produce
massive strategy files which are unintelligible to humans. We
proposed a novel formulation where the input features are the
private information cdf values and the outputs are the strat-
egy probability vectors, and we devised novel distance func-
tions between pairs of inputs and outputs that generalize the
successful earth mover’s distance. We also provided a novel
procedure for generating random distributions of private in-
1In poker a “limp” is a play when one player matches the antes
in the first play as opposed to putting in a larger bet.
formation, which we used to create a large database of game
solutions. We created algorithms that compute strategies that
can be easily implemented by humans, and deduced several
new fundamental rules about poker strategy.
We note that the contributions are not specific to poker
games. The model and formulation are general, and would
apply to any imperfect-information game where agents are
given ordered private information signals. The approaches
could also apply to perfect-information games where we can
generate a database of games by modifying the values of nat-
ural parameters. The approaches are also not specific to two-
player zero-sum games, though they do assume that solutions
can be computed for the games used in training, which can be
more challenging for other game classes.
We would like to further evaluate our new distance metrics.
An effective distance metric between strategies would have
many potential applications. For instance, a recent algorithm
for opponent exploitation computed the “closest” strategy to
a given prior strategy that agreed with the observations, using
several different distance metrics (EMD outperformed L1 and
L2) [Ganzfried and Sandholm, 2011]. Effective strategy dis-
tance metrics would also be useful for detecting “bot” agents
on online sites who are playing a strategy similar to a specific
known strategy. We would also like to implement full-game
exploitability as a new metric to evaluate the “cost” of a strat-
egy, which can be integrated with all the learning approaches.
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